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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Jodie Edwards timely appealed from the 
On appeal, Mr. Edwards that the district 
to suppress the State's evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
judgment of conviction. 
it denied her motion 
A police officer, Officer Hughes, noticed a truck with a bed that was 
approximately twenty inches of the ground that did not have any mud flaps. (R., pp.27, 
109-110.) Officer Hughes suspected that the driver of truck, Ms. Edwards, was in 
violation of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), which requires all trucks to have fenders or covers which 
"in full width from a point above and forward of the center of the tires over and to 
the rear of the wheels to a point that is not more than ten (10) inches above the surface 
of the highway when the vehicle is empty." (R., pp.27, 109-110.) Based on that 
suspicion, Officer Hughes pulled Ms. Edwards over. (R., pp.27, 109-110.) While 
checking the status Ms. Edwards' driver's license, Officer Hughes discovered that she 
had an outstand warrant and arrested her. (R., pp.27, 109-110.) While 
conducting an inventory search of Ms. Edwards' vehicle, Officer Hughes discovered 
methamphetamine. (R., pp.27-28, 109-110.) 
Ms. Edwards was charged, by information, with possession of a controlled 
substance. (R., pp.78-79.) Ms. Edwards filed a motion to suppress evidence and a 
memorandum in support, wherein she argued that I.C. § 49-949(1 )(c) exempted her 
truck from the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), because it had a factory built 
bumper. (R., pp.99-108.) Ms. Edwards also argued that I.C. § 49-949(2)(b) exempted 
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her truck from the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), because her existing fenders and 
bumper were capable, at ail times, of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, and other 
substances. (R., pp.102-106.) Instead of holding a hearing on the motion, the parties 
stipulated to the facts. (R., pp.97-98.) 
The district court ultimately disagreed with Ms. Edwards, ruling that the 
exemption contained in I.C. § 49-949(1 )(c) was not applicable to Ms. Edwards' truck 
because the statute contained the phrase "every motor vehicle other than trucks." 
(R., pp.111-114.) The district court also ruled that I.C. § 49-949(2)(b) is not an 
exemption to I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), and that the statute actually requires that all fenders or 
covers, which comply with I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), must also be capable of arresting and 
deflecting dirt, mud, water, and other substances. (R., pp.114-115.) 
Ms. Edwards entered a conditional Alford1 plea, preserving her ability to 
challenge the denial of her suppression motion on appeal. (R., pp.120-122; Tr., p.4, 
L.21 - p.5, L.10.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of four years, 
with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Ms. Edwards on 
probation. (R., pp.175-178.) Ms. Edwards timely appealed. (R., pp.206-208.) 
1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Edwards' motion to suppress evidence 
because her truck was in compliance with I.C. § 49-949? 
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Ttle District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Edwards' Motion To Suppress Evidence 
Because Her Truck Was In Compliance With I.C. § 49-949 
Ms. claims that the district when it denied her motion 
suppress evidence because her rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, were violated 
when she was detained without reasonable suspicion. Specifically, Ms. Edwards 
argues that her truck was exempted from the "mud flap" requirement contained in 
I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), because her truck had a factory built bumper. Additionally, 
argues that her truck was exempted from "mud flap" requirement contained in 
I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), because her truck's bumper fenders were capable of arresting 
and deflecting dirt, mud, water, and other substances. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Idaho appellate courts apply a bifurcated standard of review upon a challenge to 
a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress. First, an appellate court defers to the trial 
court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous. State v. Willoughby, 
147 Idaho 482, 485 (2009). Second, appellate courts review de nova the trial court's 
application of constitutional and statutory principles to the facts as found. Id. at 485-
486; see also City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 65, 
69 (2003). 
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C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Edwards' Motion To Suppress 
Evidence Because Her Truck Was In Compliance With LC.§ 49-949 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution secures to the people 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Willoughby, 14 7 Idaho at 
486. Similar privacy rights are also protected under Article I Section 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43 (1927); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981 
(1992). 
Even brief detentions of individuals must comport with State and Federal 
requirements of reasonableness. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). This 
means that the detention must be both justified at its inception and reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that originally justified the interference in the first place. Id. 
Limited detentions of individuals may be permissible where there is reasonable, 
articulable suspicion on the part of the officer that the person detained has committed, 
or is about to commit, a crime. Id. at 811. However, the officer must be able to point to 
specific, articulable facts in support of the detention - and this requires more than a 
mere hunch on the part of the officer or "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion." Id. 
(quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)). The question of whether an 
officer possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion is evaluated by examining the 
totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of, or before, the detention. 
Id. 
When a defendant moves to exclude evidence on the grounds that it was 
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment and/or Article I Section 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution, the government carries the burden of proving that the search or seizure in 
question was reasonable. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. If the government fails to meet 
this burden, the remedy is suppression of the State's evidence. Id. Additionally, "If 
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evidence is not seized pursuant to a mcognized exception to the warrant requirement, 
the evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the 'fruit of 
the poisonous tree." State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 963 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). 
Ms. Edwards argues that Officer Hughes did not have reasonable suspicion to 
detain her because her truck was in compliance with I.C. § 49-949. The applicable 
portions of that statute provide: 
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or move or any owner to 
permit to be operated or moved, any motor vehicle, truck, bus, semitrailer 
or trailer, upon any highway without having the vehicle equipped with 
fenders or covers which may include flaps or splash aprons, over and to 
the rear of wheels, as follows: 
1.C. § 49-949. 
(a) On the rear wheels of every truck equipped with a body, 
bus, trailer or semitrailer the fenders or covers shall extend 
in full width from a point above and forward of the center of 
the tires over and to the rear of the wheels to a point that is 
not more than ten (10) inches above the surface of the 
highway when the vehicle is empty 
Ms. Edwards argues that even though her truck2 did not have a cover which 
extended to a point which was not more than ten inches from the surface of the 
highway, she argues that her truck was still in compliance with I.C. 49-949, because her 
truck fell within an exemption to the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), which is 
contained in I.C. 49-949(1 )(c). That provision follows: 
(c) Behind all wheels of every motor vehicle other than trucks, buses, 
semitrailers, or trailers, the fenders or covers shall extend in full width from 
a point above and forward of the center of the tire over and to the rear of 
2 Idaho Code Section 49-121 (1 0)(c) defines pickup truck as "Every motor vehicle eight 
thousand (8,000) pounds gross weight or less which is designed, used or maintained 
primarily for the transportation of property." Ms. Edwards stipulated that she was driving 
a pickup truck, as defined by I.C. § 49-121(10)(c). (R., p.98.) 
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the wheel to a point that is not more than twenty (20) inches above the 
surface of the highway, unless the bumper is a factory built bumper 
fastened directly to the frame of the vehicle pursuant to factory installation 
requirements 
I.C. § 49-949(1 )(c) (emphasis added). The district court disagreed with Ms. Edwards 
and ruled that I.C. § 49-949(1 )(c), is not applicable to her truck, because the statute 
contains the phrase "other than trucks." (R., pp.111-114.) Mindful of the fact that the 
plain language of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(c) does not apply to trucks, Ms. Edwards nonetheless 
asserts that her factory built bumper exempts her truck from the requirements of 
1.C. § 49-949(1)(a). (R., pp.99-108.) 
Ms. Edwards also argues that her truck was in compliance with I.C. § 49-949, 
because her truck was exempted from the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), due to a 
provision contained in I.C. § 49-949(2)(b). The applicable portions of I.C. § 49-949(2) 
follow: 
(2) Fenders or covers, as used in subsection (1) of this section, shall be 
deemed to be of sufficient size and construction as to comply with those 
requirements if constructed as follows: 
(b) The fender or cover is constructed as to be capable at all 
times of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other 
substance as may be picked up and carried by wheels 
I.C. § 49-949(2). Ms. Edwards argues that I.C. § 49-949(2)(b), exempts all vehicles 
from the requirements contained in I.C. § 49-949(1 ), if the vehicle's fender or cover is 
capable of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substances. (R., pp.99-
108.) The district court disagreed with Ms. Edwards and ruled that I.C. § 49-949(2)(a), 
adds a general requirement, in addition to those contained in I.C. § 49-949(1 ), to all 
fenders and covers that they are capable of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or 
other substances. (R., pp.114-115.) Regardless of whether I.C. § 49-949(2)(b) 
7 
exempts vehicles from the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1) or whether I.C. § 49·-
949(2)(b) adds requirements to those contained I.C. § 49-949(1 ), Ms. Edwards did not 
submit any evidence to support her theory that her vehicle's fenders and bumper were 
capable of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substances. (R., pp.97-
98.) Mindful of this evidentiary shortcoming, Ms. Edwards still argues that I.C. § 49-
949(2)(b) exempts her truck from the requirements of I.C. § 49-949(1 )(a), because her 
truck was capable of arresting and deflecting dirt, mud, water, or other substances. 
Ms. Edwards maintains that she was in compliance with I.C. § 49-949, and that 
Officer Hughes illegally detained her. Due to the illegality of her initial detention she 
argues that all evidence which was discovered as a result of that detention must be 
suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Edwards respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
order denying her motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 18th day of November, 2014. 
, , 
{..,,·-··~ .......... ·-.. . 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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